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Abstract
Psychological essentialism is a worldview in which social categories are mistakenly identified as
having a fixed, naturally occurring, and homogenous nature inherent to them (Haslam, 1998;
Rothbart & Taylor, 1992). Furthermore, essentialist cognitions are believed to be composed of
two independent factors – beliefs that social groups are naturally occurring, fixed, and
unchanging (i.e., natural kinds beliefs) and beliefs that the group is homogenous and inherently
distinct from other groups (i.e., entitative beliefs). Previous research has demonstrated that
individuals with stronger essentialist beliefs toward social classes (e.g., race, sexual orientation,
mental illness) tend to exhibit more prejudice against these groups (Haqanee, Lou, & Lalonde,
2014; Haslam & Levy, 2006; Verkuyten, 2003). The current study aimed to further clarify
essentialist cognitive frameworks toward mental illness by examining the efficacy of essentialistinconsistent educational interventions on stigma reduction. More specifically, 62 participants
were recruited to participate in a study to ostensibly review a mental illness informational
pamphlet. Participants completed an initial series of measures assessing their attitudes toward
schizophrenia, and were assigned one of three informational pamphlets (correcting entitative
beliefs, natural kinds beliefs, or neither) during a follow-up session. It was predicted that
participants assigned to the entitative belief condition would show significantly greater
reductions in mental illness stigma, compared to the participants in both the natural kinds and

control conditions. Contrary to this prediction, participants in the control condition tended to
show the greatest reduction in mental illness stigma, particularly involving beliefs about the
dangerousness of individuals with schizophrenia. The present study also examined the
malleability of essentialist beliefs (i.e., whether exposure to written material would be sufficient
in lowering essentialist beliefs). Participant endorsement of both natural kinds and entitative
beliefs of schizophrenia showed significant reductions, independent of the intervention condition
to which they were assigned. Results and future directions are discussed.
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Modifying Essentialist Beliefs Toward Mental Illness: An Alternative Focus for Anti-Stigma
Interventions
Social stigma is the devaluation and dehumanization of a person or group of people based
on shared characteristics that separate them from other members of society (Crocker & Quinn,
2003; Goffman, 1963). The presence of social stigma has far-reaching consequences on the lives
of persons with mental health issues. For example, mental illness stigmatization has been shown
to cause detrimental effects in the workplace, resulting in fewer promotions, job offers, and less
friendly behavior from both supervisors and co-workers (Corrigan, 2007; Farina & Felner, 1973;
Hinshaw & Cicchetti, 2000). Link, Struening, Neese-Todd, Asmussen and Phelan (2001) have
found that individuals with mental illnesses who were exposed to negative stigma have shown
significant decreases in self-esteem. Additionally, stigma has been linked to exacerbated
symptomatology via increased depression and pessimism (Link, 1987; Ritsher, Otilingam, &
Grajales, 2003; Sibitz et al., 2011). Sirey et al. (2001) have found that increased perceptions of
stigmatization among mental health clients has been linked to higher non-compliance rates as
measured by both treatment attendance and medication adherence. Mental health clients with
particularly stigmatized disorders (e.g. schizophrenia, bipolar disorder) report that the stigma
they face is worse than the illness itself (Lincoln, Arens, Berger, & Rief, 2008).
Stigma arises from the connection of negative, biased stereotypes to those characteristics
that distinguish individuals from other members of society. Print and televised news outlets often
depict mental illness in a violent and dangerous content (Cross, 2004; Magli, Buizza, & Pioli,
2004; McGinty, Webster, & Barry, 2013). Televised media, in particular, can also model negative
reactions to mental illness by promoting fear, rejection and misunderstanding (Stuart, 2006).
These unflattering portrayals may lead to an inaccurate understanding of mental illness among
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the lay public. In addition, Hiday (1995) suggests that social factors typically associated with
mental illness (e.g., substance abuse, poverty, and exposure to violence) may be more strongly
associated with violence than the presence of the mental illness per se.
The frequency of these stereotyped messages strengthen the specious link between
bizarre, dangerous, and aggressive behaviors to mental illness. For example, Link (1987) found
in his sample of participants with psychiatric symptoms that those who were labeled mentally ill
experienced demoralization from the community, even in the absence of dangerous or aberrant
behavior. This may, in part, be due to the fact that the term “mental illness” brings to mind a
distinct, homogenous group among lay public members. This “groupness”, otherwise referred to
as entitativity, is the extent to which a group of people is considered a meaningful unit with deep
commonalities (Campbell, 1958), and is theorized to be a component of a broader cognitive bias
termed essentialist beliefs.
Essentialist Beliefs
Psychological essentialism is a cognitive bias in which certain social categories are
misunderstood as having a fixed, underlying and homogenous nature, and certain categories are
more natural than others (Haslam, 1998). Allport (1954) suggested that this rigid, essentialized
mindset was the basis for prejudiced attitudes. Indeed, essentialist beliefs have been shown to
moderate thinking about various groups of people, including ethnic minorities (Gil-White, 2001),
race (Verkuyten, 2003), sexual orientation (Haslam & Levy, 2006) and personality (Haslam,
Bastian, & Bissett, 2004). Rothbart and Taylor (1992) developed a fundamental theory
suggesting that essentialism involves a misunderstanding of social categories as “natural kinds,”
i.e. groups that develop through historical and social contexts are misrepresented as biological
categories or species. They further speculated that natural kinds beliefs are comprised of two
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sub-beliefs: that members of essential categories cannot lose their membership in that category
(immutability), and that the essential category allows individuals to induce qualities that
members of that category share (inductive potential). For example, an individual maintaining an
essentialist belief toward a schizophrenic would subsequently endorse the beliefs that
schizophrenia is incurable, and that aspects of the schizophrenic's identity could be inferred
based on the inclusion in the “schizophrenia” group.
Further research by Haslam, Rothschild, and Ernst (2000) has demonstrated a two-factor
model of essentialist thinking that elucidates the Rothbart and Taylor model. The first factor,
natural kinds, combines beliefs of immutability, biological basis, discreteness, historical
invariance and defining features of a category. The second factor, entitativity, is composed of
beliefs that a category has an underlying, inherent basis, is homogenous, and offers inductive
potential about category members. Subsequent research has provided empirical support on the
validity of the two-factor model with a variety of social categories, including race, gender, sexual
orientation, and mental illness (Haqanee, Lou, & Lalonde, 2014; Haslam & Ernst, 2002; Haslam
& Levy, 2006; Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2002).
Essentialist Beliefs and Mental Illness Stigma
Research has demonstrated that the degree of entitativity and natural kinds belief
individuals hold toward a certain group affect their prejudice toward that group. For example,
Haslam, Rothschild, and Ernst (2000, 2002) have found that entitativity self-report ratings were
negatively correlated with evaluations of various social groups, including evaluations directed
toward those with mental illness. Similarly, Phelan (2005) has shown that when participants were
provided vignettes that portray mental illness as being caused by genetics (i.e., natural kinds),
participants reported an increased desire for social distance. Finally, sexual, gender, and racial
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groups that are subject to prejudice (e.g. homosexuals, women, and Jews) were rated higher than
control groups (e.g. heterosexuals, males, and Christians) on at least one essentialist factor
(Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000).
These findings have also been supported in mental illness stigma research. Haqanee, Lou,
and Lalonde (2014) found that entitativity beliefs are a significant predictor of prejudice toward
schizophrenia, over and above predictions based on previous contact and natural kinds beliefs.
Similarly, Phelan (2005) exposed participants to vignettes that depicted schizophrenia or
depression as either genetically caused (i.e. providing support for natural kinds) or not.
Participants who were led to believe that the mental illnesses had a genetic component showed a
stronger desire for social distance than those that did not receive the manipulation. These same
genetic causal attributions of mental illness have also been linked to poor prognosis of treatment
and more recommendations for mental hospitalizations (Phelan, Yang, & Cruz-Rojas, 2006).
Anti-stigma Interventions
Many anti-stigma interventions have been based on the “medical model” of mental illness
(Guze, 1992; Laing, 1971), which suggests that “mental illness is an illness just like any other.”
These interventions have been implemented in various countries (Becker & Vazquez-Barqureo,
2001; Crisp, 2000; Sartorius, 1997). However, the lay public has largely rejected this model of
intervention (Angermeyer & Dietrich, 2006; Read, Haslam, Sayce, & Davies, 2006).
Additionally, public health researchers have called the medical model into question (Albee &
Joffe, 2004; Luchins, 2004; Schnitker, 2008). Despite the lack of reduction in stigmatic attitudes,
anti-stigma interventions have been shown to modify or otherwise change the ways in which the
lay public conceptualizes mental illness (Angermeyer & Dietrich, 2006). For example, a metaanalysis of national representative population samples by Schomerus et al. (2012) has shown that
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over time, the public has become increasingly more knowledgeable of biomedical models of
mental illness.
By suggesting that mental illness is attributable to medical causes, researchers argue, lay
people have been led to believe that individuals with mental illnesses have no control over their
thoughts or behaviors (Read, Haslam, Sayce, & Davies, 2006). This hypothesis may explain why
attitudes toward the mentally ill have not improved despite these interventions (Green,
McCormick, Walkey, & Taylor, 1987; Trute, Tefft, & Segall, 1989). Indeed, information
attributing biological causes to mental illness has been found to increase perceptions of
dangerousness (Lam, Salkovskis, & Warwick, 2005) and unpredictability (Read & Law, 1999).
Other psychoeducational interventions, focusing on educating the public about severe
mental illness and correcting existing myths on mental illness, have been more successful at
improving attitudes toward mental illness (Holmes, Corrigan, Williams, Canar, & Kubiak, 1999;
Morrison, Cocozza, & Vanderwyst, 1980; Penn, Kommana, Mansfield, & Link, 1999). Although
longer (i.e. semester-long) courses tend to have larger effect sizes, even brief information
sessions have shown to result in significant reductions in stigmatization (Thornton & Wahl,
1996).
The Present Research
As evidenced by previous research, stigma and prejudice toward schizophrenia may be
predicted by the degree to which an individual holds entitative beliefs about the disorder
(Haqanee, Lou, & Lalonde, 2014). However, certain natural kinds beliefs (most notably,
naturalness) have also been shown to influence attitudes toward mental illness (Phelan, 2005;
Phelan, Yang, Cruz-Rojas, 2006). As of yet, however, there is a dearth of research evidence
exploring the relative strengths of entitative and natural kinds beliefs in predicting mental illness
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stigmatization. The present research sought to clarify the effects of manipulating entitative
beliefs and natural kinds beliefs on stigma toward a specific mental disorder (schizophrenia).
More specifically, manipulation of essentialist beliefs was conducted using a brief mental illness
informational brochure. This method of education is a particularly attractive one, given the ease
of delivery to the population, and the relatively low costs associated with implementation and
delivery. Furthermore, pamphlet interventions are already in frequent use, and have been found
to significantly influence public attitudes of general medical health issues (Huttner, Goossens,
Verheij, & Harbath, 2010) and psychological issues (Hammer & Vogel, 2010).
The present research consisted of an experiment in which participants reported preexisting stigmatizing attitudes regarding schizophrenia. Participants then read informational
pamphlets contradicting essentialist beliefs, and again rated their stigma beliefs about
schizophrenia, allowing for assessment of attitude change as a result of exposure to essentialisminconsistent information. Because essentialism has been shown to be related to stigmatic beliefs
across a variety of prejudiced groups (Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000), I hypothesized that
participant self-report of stigma would be significantly reduced following exposure to the
essentialism-inconsistent pamphlets. Furthermore, the present study utilized two separate
intervention pamphlets, addressing either entitative or natural kinds beliefs, allowing for a more
nuanced understanding of the role that each belief type plays on mental illness stigmatization.
The design of the present research also allowed for a replication and expanded
understanding of previous research by demonstrating the associations between essentialist beliefs
and stigma. On the basis of previous research by Haqanee, Lou, & Lalonde (2014), I
hypothesized that stigma towards the mentally ill is more strongly predicted by entitative beliefs
than natural kinds beliefs. Furthermore, I hypothesized that an individual's natural kinds beliefs
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would correlate with an endorsement of genetic causal attributions for schizophrenia. In
particular, examining this relationship in the context of a mental illness pamphlet could further
elucidate the degree to which presentation of essentialism-inconsistent information could change
an individual’s preexisting beliefs about mental illness.

Method
Participants and Design
Sixty-two Introductory Psychology students (46 female, 16 male; Mage = 18.85 years, SD
= 1.84 years, range: 18-28 years) from a small-sized southern university were recruited to
participate in the present study in exchange for partial fulfillment of their research credit in a
psychology course. In some instances, per course instructor discretion, students were offered
extra credit in lieu of research credit fulfillment. The study employed a 3(anti-stigma
intervention: entitative beliefs vs. natural kinds beliefs vs. control) x 2(time: pre-test vs. posttest) mixed design with the latter factor assessed as within subjects.
Procedure
Participants first provided consent by signing an informed consent form (Appendix A),
which was subsequently stored in a secure location to ensure confidentiality and anonymity. As
part of the consent process, participants were told that they would be taking part in a pilot study
examining the effectiveness of a new mental illness information pamphlet that would be
distributed at the university counseling center. Participants were informed prior to the initial
session that the study would require them to return at a later date to evaluate the pamphlet.
Participants then completed a demographics questionnaire (Appendix B) and read a short
informational briefing regarding schizophrenia (Appendix C). This briefing listed the primary
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symptoms of schizophrenia in non-technical terms, consistent with the DSM-IV diagnostic
criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 1994), and contained paraphrased information from
an undergraduate level textbook (Weiten, Dunn, & Hammer, 2012).
Essentialist beliefs. A primary focus of this study was to examine the malleability of
essentialist beliefs following exposure to anti-stigma interventions that challenge those
essentialist beliefs. Haslam and Levy (2006) developed a scale measuring essentialist beliefs for
use with homosexuality, similar to one used by Haslam and Ernst (2002) in their study of
essentialist beliefs toward mental illness, but including measures adapted from Hegarty and
Pratto (2001) measuring the biological basis, fixity, and cross-cultural universality. Both the scale
used by Haslam and Levy (2006) and the one used by Haslam and Ernst (2002) were combined
in the present study to explore a broader understanding of essentialism (Appendix D).
Additionally, an item used by Haqanee, Lou, and Lalonde (2014) was included to explore the
entitativity belief of exclusivity. This scale was then separated into two subscales measuring
entitativity (four items, e.g., “Schizophrenia is a category that is exclusive; such a category does
not allow a person to belong to other categories”), and natural kinds beliefs (seven items, e.g.,
“Schizophrenia is caused by biological factors, such as genes or hormones”), given the theorized
two-factor theory of essentialist beliefs (Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2002). A third set of nonessentialist stigma items were included to examine belief change among control participants.
Participants responded to the items using a five-point Likert scale with anchors at 1 (Very
strongly disagree) and 5 (Very strongly agree).
This scale was used as a manipulation check to determine whether participants'
essentialist beliefs toward mental illness had changed, and was administered at two time points:
the initial session and following participant exposure to the anti-stigma pamphlet. Responses
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were then coded and averaged across each subscale to create three composite scales such that
higher numbers reflect greater entitative, natural kinds, and general stigma beliefs. Reliability
scores for the entitativity items pre-intervention was poor (Cronbach’s alpha = .59), and
unacceptable for both the natural kinds items (α = .27) and control items (α = .27). Postintervention reliability scores were acceptable for the entitativity items (α = .63), but similarly
unacceptable for both the natural kinds items (α = -.05; the negative reliability score suggesting
weak correlations between items) and control items (α = .31). Therefore, a single item,
mutability (“A schizophrenic individual can become mentally healthy or completely cured.”) was
chosen to best represent the natural kinds belief. This item was chosen because it was directly
addressed in the natural kinds education condition, and it has previously been shown to be more
strongly related to change in other natural kinds essentialist beliefs (Haslam & Ernst, 2002). One
participant failed to answer the mutability item during the second session (i.e., after receiving the
mental illness pamphlet). Therefore, this participant has been excluded from all manipulation
check analyses. Given the low reliability ratings for the entitativity belief items, interpretations
of analyses involving entitativity beliefs should be made cautiously.
Stigma measures. Because mental illness stigma is a multifaceted concept of both
stereotyped beliefs and prejudicial feelings (Rusch, Angermeyer, & Corrigan, 2005), several
measures were utilized to capture a broader picture of stigma. One of the most common
measures of stigma used in the literature is the desire for social distance (Angermeyer et al.,
2011; Jorm & Oh, 2009), or an individual’s willingness to engage in contact with a member of
another group in various social contexts. The social distance measure used in this study
(Appendix E) was adapted from one used by Link, Cullen, Frank, and Wozniak (1987) , which in
turn is a modified version of the Bogardus Social Distance Scale (Bogardus, 1925). It consisted
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of seven items representing various degrees of social relationships. Using a five-point Likert
scale with anchors at 1 (in no case at all) to 5 (in any case), participants indicated the extent to
which they would accept a schizophrenic individual in each social relationship. Responses were
then reverse-coded, so that higher scores indicate a greater desire for social distance, implying
higher levels of prejudice. A second measure of stigma used in the present study (Appendix F),
measuring participant perceptions of dangerousness and dependency, was developed by
Angermeyer, Matschinger, and Corrigan (2004). This instrument listed eight personality
characteristics depicting dangerousness (i.e. “dangerous,” “unpredictable,” “lacking selfcontrol,” “aggressive,” and “frightening) and dependency (i.e. “dependent upon others,”
“helpless,” and “needy”). Participants indicated their beliefs regarding how dangerous and
dependent upon others schizophrenic individuals are, using a seven-point Likert scale with
anchors at 1 (definitely not true) to 7 (definitely true). Responses were then averaged to create
aggregate measures of dangerousness and dependence beliefs. The items for the dangerousness
scale were found to maintain good internal consistency, α = .85, while the items used in the
dependence measure were also acceptably reliable, α = .67. These reliability coefficients are
similar to the Cronbach’s alpha of .88 reported in the original study (reliability of the dependency
scale was not reported).
Following completion of these measures, participants were thanked for their time,
provided research credit, and asked to return in two weeks to complete the second part of the
study.
Anti-stigma interventions. Upon return to the second part of the study, participants were
randomly assigned to one of three anti-stigma interventions (Appendix H), exposing them to
information inconsistent with entitativity beliefs (n = 20), natural kinds beliefs (n = 21), or a non-
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essentialist control condition (n = 21). The interventions were designed such that sections of the
pamphlets directly corresponded with items from the essentialist belief measure (Appendix D);
such items are designated by an asterisk (*). Participants were told that these pamphlets were
intended for distribution at the university counseling center, and that the study was focused on
evaluating the effectiveness of the pamphlet, in an effort to minimize the effects of social
desirability effects. These psychoeducational pamphlets were kept as similar to one another as
possible, only differing for the purposes of manipulating the type of essentialist belief. To further
disguise the purpose of the study, participants were asked to rate various aspects of the pamphlet,
including readability and design (Appendix I).
Social dominance orientation (SDO). Social dominance orientation reflects an
individual's attitude toward intergroup relationships, and whether they idealize these relations to
be equal or hierarchical. High-SDO individuals prefer social groups that are organized by
superiority, while low-SDO individuals prefer a socialist, equal organization. SDO has been
found to predict prejudice toward individuals with mental illness, and controlling for SDO has
previously elicited stronger correlations between essentialist beliefs and mental illness stigma
(Bizer, Hart, & Jekogian, 2012; Haqanee, Lou, & Lalonde, 2014). Therefore, I have included a
15-item measure by Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth and Malle (1994) that has been used previously
in mental illness stigma research (Appendix J). Participants were asked to read a number of
statements pertaining to intergroup relationships (e.g., “To get ahead in life, it is sometimes
necessary to step on other groups”) and asked to report their agreement with the statement using
a 7-point Likert scale with anchors of 1 (very negative) and 7 (very positive). Seven items
reflected statements that indicated equivalent intergroup relations (e.g., “Group equality should
be our ideal”) and were subsequently reverse-coded. Reliability analyses revealed that the
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responses maintained good internal consistency with one another, α = .89. Items were then
averaged together to create a mean social dominance score, such that higher numbers indicated a
stronger desire for social dominance.
Social desirability. Given that participants may have been motivated to minimize their
prejudicial attitudes toward mental illness, the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale was
included in the study to assess for response bias (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960; Appendix K). This
33-item measure evaluates the extent to which a participant’s responses may be a reflection of
their desire to appear politically correct, rather than an accurate representation of their own
beliefs. Participants were asked to read statements (e.g., “I like to gossip at times”) and report
whether they felt the statement pertained to them personally by using true or false responses.
Reponses were then coded such that responses consistent with high social desirability were
scored as a 1, while non-socially desirable responses were scored as a 0. The coded responses
were found to maintain acceptable internal reliability, α = .70. The responses were then summed
for each participant, creating a composite score in which higher values represented a stronger
tendency toward socially desirable responses.
Causal Attributions. In order to test the hypothesis that natural kinds beliefs of mental
illness are associated with the belief that mental illness is caused by biogenetic factors,
participants were administered a 9-item measure assessing their attributions for the causes of
mental illness (Jorm, et al., 1997; Appendix G). Participants were asked to read statements
portraying possible causes of mental illness (e.g., “The recent death of a close friend or relative”)
and asked to report how likely each was to result in schizophrenia using a 5-point Likert scale
with anchors of 1 (very unlikely) and 7 (very likely). Though the entire measure was included for
the sake of posterity, only the item directly assessing biogenetic causes, “Genetics or inherited,”
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was used in the present analyses.
Post-test measures. Participants were then reassessed using the essentialist beliefs
measure (Appendix D), both as a manipulations check and to measure the degree to which
essentialist beliefs may have globally decreased as a result of psychoeducation rather than the
specifically targeted entitativity and natural kinds interventions. Participants were also
reevaluated on the social distance, dangerousness and dependence stigma measures (Appendices
E and F) following exposure to the anti-stigma interventions, in order to measure the degree to
which the various interventions decreased stigma. In order to disguise the purpose of study,
participants were told that some of the data taken during the first session were lost due to a
computer error, and therefore would need to be recollected. Finally, participants were provided a
debriefing statement (Appendix L), including an explanation of the deception used in the
research and the necessity of the use of deception, provided a second research credit, and
thanked for their time.
Results
Manipulation Check
To evaluate whether the manipulation had the intended effect of influencing the targeted
belief, a 2 (time: pre vs. post) x 2 (belief type: entitative vs. natural kinds) by 3 (anti-stigma
intervention: entitative beliefs vs. natural kinds beliefs vs. control) mixed design ANOVA was
conducted with time and belief type as the within-subjects factor and intervention as the
between-subjects factor. Mean and standard deviation values are provided in Table 1. There was
a significant main effect of time, F(1, 58) = 14.88, p < .001, ηp2 = .20, as well as a significant
main effect of belief type, F(1, 58) = 46.81, p < .001, ηp2 = .45. A marginally significant Belief
Type x Intervention two-way interaction was also found, F(2, 58) = 2.90, p = .063, ηp2 = .09.
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Contrary to prior expectations, there was no significant three-way time x belief type x
intervention, F(2, 58) = 1.97, p = .148, ηp2 = .06, suggesting that changes in participant beliefs
over time did not depend upon the condition to which they were assigned.
Stigma Measures
Social Distance. A 2 (time) x 3 (intervention) mixed-design ANOVA with time as the
within-subjects variable and intervention as the between-subjects variable was run on the
measure of social distance to determine how social distance varied as a function of pamphlet
exposure. A significant main effect of time emerged, F(1, 59) = 11.96, p = .001, ηp2 = .17, Mpre =
3.05, SD = 0.89, Mpost = 2.81, SD = 0.89. The predicted time x intervention interaction was not
significant, F(2, 59) = 1.46, p = .240, ηp2 = .05 (see Figure 1).
Dangerousness. A second 2 x 3 mixed-design ANOVA, with the same independent
variables and dangerousness as the dependent variable, revealed a significant main effect of time,
F(1, 59) = 32.80, p < .001, ηp2 = .36. However, this main effect was qualified by a significant
time by intervention interaction effect, F(2, 59) = 3.18, p = .049, ηp2 = .10 (see Figure 2). Followup simple effects analyses using a pooled error term revealed that among participants exposed to
the entitativity pamphlet, perceptions of dangerousness decreased from Mpre = 4.14 to Mpost =
3.64 (SDs = 1.13 and 0.97, respectively). However, this difference did not reach conventional
levels of significance, F(1, 59) = 3.39, p = .071, MSE = 0.74, ηp2 = .05. Among participants who
received the natural kinds pamphlets, perceptions of dangerousness significantly decreased from
Mpre = 3.97 (SD = 1.44) prior to reading the pamphlet to Mpost = 3.24 (SD = .87) after reading the
pamphlet, F(1, 59) = 7.66, p = .008, ηp2 = .12. Participants in the control condition also
experienced a significant reduction in perceptions of dangerousness, F(1, 59) = 28.59, p < .001,
ηp2 = .33, Mpre = 4.80, SDpre = 1.21, Mpost = 3.38, SDpost = 1.03 (see Figure 3).
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Dependence. A final 2 x 3 mixed design ANOVA was conducted using the average
response on the dependence measure as the dependent variable. Participant perceptions of the
dependence of schizophrenic individuals significantly decreased from baseline levels (M = 3.44,
SD = 1.08) to their scores after reading the pamphlets (M = 3.10, SD = 1.20), F(1, 59) = 4.60, p =
.036, ηp2 = .07. The results also revealed a marginally significant time by intervention interaction
effect, F (2, 59) = 3.05, p = .055, ηp2 = .09. Although the interaction did not reach conventional
levels of significance, follow-up simple effects analysis with a pooled error term were conducted
to assess the trend of the relationship between essentialism and stigma. Participants who were
assigned to the control condition experienced a significant decrease in their perceptions of the
dependence of individuals with schizophrenia, F(1, 59) = 9.38, p = .003, MSE = 0.73, ηp2 = .14,
Mpre = 4.00, SDpre = 0.90, Mpost = 3.19, SDpost = 1.27. In contrast, participants in the entitative
condition did not subsequently show significant reductions in perceptions of dependence, F(1,
59) = 1.16, p = .286, ηp2 = .02. Participants in the natural kinds condition also failed to show a
significant reduction in perceptions of dependence, F(1, 59) = 0.18, p = .676, ηp2 = .003.
Given the lack of a significant three-way time x belief type x intervention interaction in
the manipulations check analyses, exploratory correlational analyses were conducted between
participant evaluations of beliefs of dependence and their adherence to essentialist beliefs of
schizophrenia, since changes in essentialist beliefs across time were unrelated to the condition to
which participants were assigned. The correlational analyses did not indicate a significant
relationship between participant perceptions of dependence post-intervention and participant’s
natural kinds beliefs of schizophrenia post-intervention, r(59) = .18, p = .168. Similarly,
perceptions of dependence were not significantly associated with post-intervention entitative
beliefs, r(60) = .22, p = .090. However, natural kinds beliefs post-intervention were found to be
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significantly correlated with desire for social distance post-intervention, r(59) = .35, p = .006. No
other significant correlations between essentialist beliefs and stigmatic beliefs after exposure to
the informational pamphlet were found (rs < |.19|, ps > .167). Further exploratory analyses
revealed that natural kinds beliefs pre-intervention were also significantly associated with desire
for social distance pre-intervention, r(60) = .40, p = .001. No other significant correlations
between essentialist beliefs and stigmatic beliefs prior to exposure to the informational pamphlet
were found (rs < |.26|, ps > .050).
Natural Kinds Beliefs and Causal Attributions
On the basis of previous research examining the relationship between endorsements of
biogenetic causes of mental illness (as measured post-intervention) as predictive of mental illness
stigma, Pearson bivariate correlational analyses were conducted to explore whether participant
post-intervention beliefs that mental illness is caused by genetic factors might be related to a
stronger desire for social distance, or stronger endorsements of the beliefs that individuals with
schizophrenia are more dangerous or dependent upon others post-intervention. One participant
had failed to answer the genetic causal attribution item, and was therefore excluded from the
correlational analyses. The correlations between these variables were non-significant (rs < |.15|,
ps > .278). Similarly, post-intervention beliefs that mental illness is caused by genetic factors
was not significantly associated with pre-intervention stigma measures (rs < |.23|, ps > .080).
However, genetic causal attributions were significantly and negatively related to the difference in
perceived dependence pre-intervention and post-intervention, r(59) = -.33, p = .010.
Subsequently, correlational analyses were conducted to assess whether participant
endorsement of biogenetic causes of schizophrenia were associated with either entitative or
natural kinds beliefs, both before and after the informational intervention. As predicted, neither
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entitative beliefs pre- or post-intervention were significantly correlated with biogenetic
attributions (rs = -.08 and -.04, ps = .544 and .750, respectively). Contrary to predictions,
biogenetic causal attributions were also not significantly associated with natural kinds beliefs
pre- or post-intervention, (rs = -.02 and .19, ps = .884 and .147, respectively).
Potential Covariates
Pearson bivariate correlational analyses were conducted to explore the relationship
between participant social desirability scores and their responses on the three primary prejudice
measures (desire for social distance, perceptions of dangerousness, and perceptions of
dependence upon others), both prior to and following the intervention, as well as the difference
in scores from pre- to post-intervention. However, social desirability was not significantly
associated with the measures (rs < |.14|, ps > .28) and therefore were not included as a covariate
in the ANOVAs.
Social dominance orientation, however, was significantly correlated with several
individual dependent variables, including participant desire for social distance prior to receiving
the information pamphlets (r(60) = .29, p = .021), as well as desire for social distance after
reading the information pamphlets (r(60) = .39, p = .002), perceptions of dangerousness after
receiving the pamphlets (r(60) = .35, p = .005), and perceptions of dependence after reading the
pamphlets (r(60) = .37, p = .003). However, social dominance was not significantly correlated
with the differences in these scores between pre- and post-intervention (rs < |.18|, ps > .10), thus
precluding the inclusion of SDO as a covariate in the repeated measures ANOVAs.
Discussion
Stigma Reduction
A primary goal of the present research was to examine methods by which levels of
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prejudice towards the mentally ill might be lessened. Public opinions towards the mentally ill
have been linked to the care and management of mental illness, including the afflicted
individual’s degree of embarrassment toward seeking treatment (Greene-Shortridge, Britt, &
Castro, 2007), self-management of mental illness symptomatology (Sirey et al, 2001), and the
implementation of public policy intended to increase funding and support to aid those with
mental illness (Pescosolido et al., 2010). As such, decreasing prejudice represents a fertile
avenue by which to effect change, both at the institutional and individual levels. In the present
study, participants were provided with informational pamphlets on schizophrenia intended to
lessen the degree of stereotyping through the use of psychoeducation. Importantly, the pamphlets
were not intended to alter perceptions of schizophrenia by presenting the disorder as an illness
like any other, due to the general inefficacy of this model of intervention demonstrated by the
extent literature (Albee & Joffe, 2004; Read, Haslam, Sayce, & Davies, 2006; Schnitker, 2008).
Rather, the intervention used in the present study rectified common misconceptions of
schizophrenia. The results suggest that participant perceptions of social distance significantly
decreased over time when averaged across intervention conditions. However, sans inclusion of a
control condition with no information about schizophrenia, it is impossible to determine whether
this decrease in stigmatic attitudes was due to the pamphlet intervention. Although previous
research has demonstrated that brief written informational interventions can effectively reduce
prejudice towards mental illness (Thornton & Wahl, 1996), the same can not be assumed in the
present study.
The Role of Essentialism in Mental Illness Stigma
A second purpose of the current study was to evaluate the association between
essentialism and mental illness stigma as a potential avenue for reducing prejudiced beliefs.
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Towards this aim, sections of the intervention pamphlet were devoted to either correcting myths
associated with entitative beliefs or natural kinds beliefs associated with schizophrenia.
Participants were then randomly assigned one of the intervention pamphlets to assess the degree
to which these two factors of essentialism might be changed as a result of exposure to the
educational intervention. Intriguingly, although the degree to which participants essentialized
schizophrenia decreased overall, the type of belief change did not depend upon the intervention
to which they were assigned. In other words, participants experienced decreases in entitative and
natural kinds beliefs of schizophrenia, but these decreases did not differ as a function of the
pamphlet the participant read. This finding is especially puzzling given the support for the
independence of the entitative and natural kinds constructs (Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000).
One possibility is that the relationship between essentialism and stigma may be bi-directional;
that is, just as reducing essentialist thinking reduces prejudice towards mental illness, so too
might lowered prejudice result in lessened essentialized attitudes. As an alternative explanation,
it is possible that sections of the intervention unrelated to the essentialism manipulation (i.e.,
aspects of the pamphlet that were kept constant across conditions) may have had the unintended
effect of decreasing entitative and natural kinds beliefs. Though it is not distinctly obvious where
such a manipulation might be occurring, it is plausible that a number of the statements may be
working to implicitly decrease levels of essentialist beliefs among participants.
Among specific measures of mental illness stigma, it was found that individuals assigned
to the natural kinds manipulation showed a significant decrease in perceived dangerousness of
individuals with schizophrenia, while those assigned to the entitative condition did not show
such a change. Additionally, participants assigned to the control condition also changed their
beliefs about the danger that schizophrenic individuals represent to society. Previous research has
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shown that schizophrenia is considered by the lay public to be a dangerous disorder (Angermeyer
& Matschinger, 2003). Simultaneously, attitudes toward schizophrenia seem to be heavily rooted
in both natural kinds beliefs and entitative beliefs (Haqanee, Lou, & Lalonde, 2014). Given the
pattern of changes in perceptions of dangerousness observed in the present study, it is feasible
that participant beliefs that schizophrenia is a dangerous disorder is linked to beliefs that the
immutability and discreteness of the disorder. Furthermore, this finding contradicts those of
Haqanee, Lou, and Lalonde (2014), who suggested that prejudice towards schizophrenia is more
strongly predicted by entitativity beliefs. These apparently contradictory findings between the
present study and extent literature suggest that stigma towards schizophrenia (and likely, mental
illness in general) is borne of complex origins, and the relationship between essentialist beliefs
and stigma is likely more nuanced than initially thought.
When evaluating stigma via perceptions of dependence, testing of differences across the
three conditions only resulted in marginally significant differences. However, simple effects
comparisons based upon a priori hypotheses revealed that neither entitative nor natural kinds
beliefs seemed to be associated with reductions in perceptions of dependence. The observed data
trend suggests that the two factors of essentialist beliefs are relatively independent constructs
from the perceived dependency of individuals with schizophrenia, and that there is an unexplored
construct (or set of constructs) that drives the belief that individuals with schizophrenia present
some sort of societal burden.
The finding that natural kinds beliefs and genetic causal attributions were not
significantly associated with each other is an intriguing one, especially given that natural kinds
beliefs were assessed by examining participant beliefs of immutability. Previous research by
Raman and Gelman (2005) has shown that individuals have a tendency of inferring that
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permanent illnesses are inherited (i.e., having their etiology in genetics), while temporary
illnesses are more likely to be seen as transmitted through contagion. It is unclear at this point
whether mental illnesses are perceived differently from physical illnesses within this context, and
future research could serve to clarify this point.
Limitations and Future Directions
Given a general lack of support for the primary hypotheses of the present research, it is
important to assess potential limitations stemming from the design and procedure of the present
study. An important limiting factor in the present results is the limited sample size, which results
in lower power and subsequently, a diminished ability to detect significant main and interaction
effects. A further limitation associated with the sample size is the inability to perform factor
analyses on the constructs of natural kinds and entitativity. Despite considerable disagreement on
the necessary sample size required for adequate factor analyses (MacCallum, Widaman, Zhang,
& Hong, 1999), even the most liberal recommendations suggest a minimum of 100 participants
(Gorsuch, 1983). Although previous research has suggested that the two factors are indeed
independent of one another (Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000; Haqanee, Lou, & Lalonde,
2014), it may be necessary to demonstrate the same independence exists in the present
population before assessing the changes in prejudice that occur following exposure to
information that contradicts the belief of schizophrenia as an essentialized group.
Another potential limitation regarding the present research is the fact that all participants
were recruited from a pool of students in introductory psychology courses. Participants were
provided measures assessing the degree to which they stigmatized the mentally ill at two separate
times, in the hopes that any changes in stigma were a result of the educational pamphlets
provided at the second session. However, it is possible (and perhaps even likely) that participants
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may have been exposed to information within the context of their psychology course(s) that also
influenced the degree to which they endorsed stigmatizing attitudes. Furthermore, pre- and postintervention sessions were run two to three weeks apart in order to minimize any potential
attempts by participants to reproduce the initial data from memory. Although this extended time
period was considered necessary to minimize the influence of pre-intervention scores, it also
inevitably leads to a greater likelihood that information that participants received from their
courses could have been responsible for changes in their responses. Utilizing a more diverse
subject pool (i.e., participants not currently enrolled in a psychology course) may eliminate this
potential issue.
Similarly, participant demographics were geographically limited to individuals enrolled at
a small-sized university located in eastern Kentucky. Recent epidemiological data published by
the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA, 2014) suggests that
the rate of serious mental illness (defined as “a disorder that substantially interfered with or
limited one or more major life activities”) in Kentucky was somewhat higher than the rest of the
country (4.74% in Kentucky, compared to 3.97% across the country). Although these data do not
examine the incidence of schizophrenia specifically, it is plausible that the rates of schizophrenia
may be somewhat higher in Kentucky. Given that considerable research has demonstrated that
interpersonal contact is predictive of mental illness stigma (Couture & Penn, 2003), it is possible
that residents of Kentucky may exhibit lower levels of prejudice toward the mentally ill than the
national average. Further complicating this issue is the fact that participants in the present study
were college-aged, limiting the generalizability of the results. Therefore, recruiting participants
from across the country may elicit more readily generalizable findings.
A surprising finding regarding the present study is the unexpected degree in which the
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control condition worked to decrease levels of stigma, compared to both the entitative and
natural kinds conditions. Mean comparisons suggest that the control condition was more
effective than both the entitative and natural kinds conditions at reducing perceptions of both the
dangerousness and dependence of schizophrenic individuals. Retrospective analyses of the text
of the control condition revealed that the control intervention listed information that could be
construed as depicting individuals with schizophrenia as both not dangerous (i.e., more likely to
be victims of violent behavior than to be violent themselves) and not necessarily dependent upon
others (i.e., providing examples of accomplished individuals who were diagnosed with
schizophrenia). Given this issue, it is unsurprising that participants who were exposed to this
condition would be more likely to report decreases in endorsement of the beliefs that individuals
with schizophrenia are dangerous or dependent upon others. Including a control intervention in
future studies emphasizing a portrayal of schizophrenia as a medical illness like any other may
provide compelling insight into the efficacy of altering essentialist beliefs compared to
previously implemented stigma-reduction interventions. However, care should be taken to
properly inform participants in the debriefing sessions that the information provided in the
pamphlets may not be entirely accurate.
In a similar vein, the analyses conducted failed to identify the extent to which changes in
both essentialist beliefs and stigmatic attitudes toward schizophrenia were a result of the
differences in text of the pamphlet across conditions. In order to maintain internal validity and
maximize consistency across conditions, the majority of the pamphlets were comprised of
identical text that was designed to raise awareness about schizophrenia. Consequently, it could
be argued that changes in participant beliefs may have been a result of this text, which may
explain the present finding that reductions in both natural kinds and entitative beliefs occurred
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independently of the condition to which participants were assigned. Accordingly, future research
could explore the extent to which essentialist beliefs might subtly change after exposure to
general educational information, rather than targeted interventions that explicitly seek to alter
these beliefs.
Finally, the present study demonstrated that it is relatively easy to induce changes in
essentialized beliefs via exposure to written educational pamphlets. However, it is unclear
whether these belief changes are stable across time (i.e., would participants gradually revert back
to pre-intervention levels of essentialized beliefs of schizophrenia?). Researchers may benefit
from conducting longitudinal analyses in order to examine the long-lasting effects of correcting
essentialized thinking, as well as assessing whether levels of stigma continue to be reduced as a
result of these interventions. Further exploration within this area would be invaluable in
providing further avenues of anti-stigma interventions, as well as gleaning a greater
understanding into the malleability or rigidity of essentialist beliefs.
Conclusions
The present study sought to extend the work of Haslam, Ernst, and Rothschild (2000,
2002) and Haqanee, Lou, and Lalonde (2014) examining the role of essentialist beliefs in stigma,
particularly towards severe mental illness. First, and consistent with predictions, essentialist
beliefs about schizophrenia were found to be relatively easy to manipulate in the short-term via
written informational pamphlets. However, the present study also showed changes in essentialist
beliefs under conditions that were not hypothesized to elicit belief change. Therefore, it is
currently unclear how general educational information may impact essentialized beliefs, and
future research should seek to elucidate this relationship. Secondly, the present study
demonstrated that there does seem to be a positive relationship between stigmatization of
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schizophrenia and essentialized thinking, particularly within the natural kinds factor. This finding
was inconsistent with previous research (Haslam, Ernst, & Rothschild, 2002; Haqanee, Lou, &
Lalonde, 2014), which suggested that entitative beliefs were most strongly predictive of
stigmatization of mental illness. However, this finding is consistent with Phelan (2005) and
Phelan, Yang, and Cruz-Rojas (2006), who found that beliefs related to natural kinds beliefs (i.e.,
believing schizophrenia to be caused by biogenetic factors) are associated with stronger levels of
prejudice. Furthermore, the present research provides evidence for the link between beliefs of the
immutability of schizophrenia (itself a component of natural kinds beliefs) and the desire for
social distance from individuals with schizophrenia. Trend level data was also found to support
that perceived dangerousness of schizophrenia may also be related to the natural kinds factor of
essentialist beliefs. Continued research should be conducted to identify the role in which both
natural kinds and entitative beliefs play in the expression of stigma and prejudice towards
individuals with mental illness, as well as elucidating the degree to which reductions in
essentialized thinking are stable across time.
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Table 1
Mean and SD Values of Manipulation Check Variables as a Function of Assigned Condition and
Time
Entitativity
Natural Kinds
Condition
Time
M
SD
M
SD
Entitativity
Pre
2.70
0.78
3.42
1.17
Post
1.91
0.84
3.21
1.27
Natural Kinds
Pre
2.46
0.77
3.10
1.14
Post
2.08
0.62
2.43
1.21
Control
Pre
2.64
0.79
3.62
1.12
Post
2.20
0.63
3.71
0.90
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a

a

Figure 1. Social Distance scores as a function of time and assigned intervention condition.

a

Social distance scores averaged across intervention conditions significantly decreased following the intervention, ,
p < .005.
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a

b

Figure 2. Dangerousness scores as a function of time and assigned intervention condition.
a
b

Participants assigned to the natural kinds condition exhibited a significant reduction in desire for social distance,
p < .01.
Participants assigned to the control condition exhibited a significant reduction in desire for social distance,
p < .001.
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a

a

Figure 3. Dependence scores as a function of time and assigned intervention condition.

a

Dependence scores averaged across intervention conditions significantly decreased following the intervention,
p < .05.
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Appendix A
Department of Psychology
Morehead State University
Morehead, KY
(606) 783-2981
INFORMED CONSENT STATEMENT:
“Ratings on the Effectiveness of a Mental Illness Informational Pamphlet”
This research is being conducted by David A. Butz and Fredrick T. Chin, researchers in the
Psychology department at Morehead State University. You must be at least 18 years of age in
order to participate. The present study is an investigation of social attitudes towards a variety of
interpersonal issues.
Participation in this study involves answering questions about yourself and your beliefs, and
rating the effectiveness of mental illness pamphlets intended for distribution at the Morehead
Counseling . The study is composed of two parts – you will be asked to return in 2 weeks to
complete the second part. The first part will take approximately 15-30 minutes, and the second
will take approximately 30-45 minutes.. We are interested in your honest attitudes and opinions.
If you have any questions about how to complete the surveys, you may ask the student assistant
in this project. This survey is to be taken at your own pace and individually. Please do not take
this survey with anyone else in close proximity. Your responses on the survey will be completely
anonymous. Please be as open and honest about the answers as you can while taking the survey.
If you have any questions or comments after completion of the study, you may contact the
principal investigator, Fredrick Chin, at ftchin@moreheadstate.edu
Your participation is totally voluntary and you may stop participation at any time. You are free
not to answer specific items or questions, or to complete any part of the survey. You will receive
2 (two) research credits for your participation in this survey. You may stop participation at any
point during the survey without penalty. You may choose to do something else for credit in your
psychology class in consultation with your instructor.
Your responses today will remain confidential to the extent allowed by law. Aside from the
investigators for this project, no one will have access to your questionnaire. Additionally, to
ensure anonymity, please do not put your name or other identifying information anywhere on the
questionnaire. Your informed consent form will be kept separately from the completed
questionnaire, and your name will never be linked with your responses. Any reports generated
will only use group averages, rather than individual cases.
We are required by law to report to the proper authorities any information that a person under the
age of 18 is being abused or neglected by a family member, and/or that physical abuse has
occurred between married persons. Aside from those cases, only members of the research team
will have access to your responses. While data are being collected, data will be kept on a secure
website. Upon completion of this study, data will be transferred to laboratory computers at
Morehead State University and will only be able to be accessed by members of the research
team.
This study has been reviewed by the Institutional Review Board at Morehead State University
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and has been deemed to pose little or no threat to participants. There appear to be minimal risks
or discomfort associated with completing any part of the study. The guidelines for protecting the
rights of human subjects that are in operation in this study may be found on the university web
site: http://www2.moreheadstate.edu/irb/
Questions or concerns regarding your protection and rights as a participant in this study can be
referred to Shannon Harr, Director of Research Integrity and Compliance in the Office of
Research and Sponsored Programs at Morehead State University, at (606) 783-2307. If you feel
discomfort because of your participation in the study, you are encouraged to contact Dr. David
Butz at (606) 783-2313, the MSU Counseling and Health Services Center (112 Allie Young) at
(606) 783-2123, or Pathways, Inc. in Morehead at (606) 784-4161. Any other questions
regarding the study can be referred to the principal investigator, Fredrick Chin, at (606) 3561155.
******************************************************************************
Request for signature: Please sign below to signify that you consent to participate in this project.
All participants in this study must be 18 years of age or older. Your signature below certifies
that you meet this requirement.
I have read and understand the above statement and give my voluntary consent for participation
in the study entitled “Ratings on the Effectiveness of a Mental Illness Informational
Pamphlet” (Please sign below.)
________________________________
Print Name
____________________________________
Signature
______________________
Date
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APPENDIX B
Demographics
General Instructions: The following section contains items assessing basic demographic
information
Age: ________

Gender (check one): ___ Female ___ Male

Year in College (check one):
___ Freshman
___ Sophomore
___ Junior
___ Senior
___ Other (please elaborate) ___________________
Birthplace and Nationality: I was (fill in one):
Born in the U.S. in (town) ______________________ , (state) ______
Born in another country (Please list country) ______________________
If you were born in another country, how many years have you lived in the U.S.? ________
Religious Group Membership (check one):
___ Protestant
___ Catholic
___ Muslim
___ Jewish
___ Buddhist
___ Agnostic
___ Atheist
___ Other (please specify) _________________________________
How strongly do you identify yourself as a member of the religious group you checked
above?
NOT AT ALL

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

VERY MUCH

How would you classify your political ideology?
1

2

very
liberal

liberal
slightly
middle of
the road conservative

3

4

5

6

slightly
conservative
conservative

How would you classify your political party affiliation?
_____ Democratic

_____ Republican

_____ Other

7
very liberal
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APPENDIX C
Schizophrenia Information
Schizophrenia is a disorder marked by disturbances in thought that spill over to affect perceptual,
social, and emotional processes. This disorder is marked by cognitive deficits and disturbed
thought processes that often lead to various delusions, such as the belief that one's thoughts are
being broadcast to the government. Schizophrenics also often suffer from hallucinations,
perceiving things that aren't there. For example, many schizophrenics complain of hearing
voices in their heads, or seeing famous people in their homes. Schizophrenia may also disrupt
emotional expression. Some sufferers show very little emotion, while others may show
inappropriate emotions that are inconsistent with the situation or what they are saying. Despite
popular misconception, this disorder should not be confused with multiple personality disorder.
The following is a quote from an individual with schizophrenia:
“I'm pregnant with the song of God. I work for Epic Records. I'm Joan of Arc. I'm Florence
Nightingale. The door between the ward and the porch is the dividing line between New York and
California. Divorce isn't a piece of paper, it's a feeling. Forget about Zip Codes.”
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APPENDIX D
Essentialist Beliefs/Manipulations Check
There are many people in the community who exhibit schizophrenic behaviors. The next
few questions are about the nature of these sorts of problems. There are no right or wrong
answers to these questions. Rather, you may have to reflect on your intuitions and prior
experiences, or “go with your gut.”
* Biological Basis (natural kinds)
Schizophrenia is caused by biological factors such as genes and hormones.
Very strongly disagree
1
2
3
4
5
Very strongly agree
* Immutability (natural kinds)
A schizophrenic individual can become mentally healthy or completely cured. (R)
Very strongly disagree
1
2
3
4
5
Very strongly agree
* Discreteness (natural kinds)
Schizophrenia is a category with clear and sharp boundaries: people are either mentally ill,
or they are mentally healthy.
Very strongly disagree
1
2
3
4
5
Very strongly agree
Fixity (natural kinds)
Whether or not a person will become schizophrenic is pretty much set early on in
childhood.
Very strongly disagree
1
2
3
4
5
Very strongly agree
Defining Features (natural kinds)
Schizophrenic individuals have necessary or defining characteristics, without which they
would not be mentally ill.
Very strongly disagree
1
2
3
4
5
Very strongly agree
Historical Invariance (natural kinds)
Schizophrenia has probably existed throughout history.
Very strongly disagree
1
2
3
4
5

Very strongly agree

Universality (natural kinds)
Schizophrenia probably only exists in certain cultures. (R)
Very strongly disagree
1
2
3
4
5

Very strongly agree

* Informativeness (entitativity)
Schizophrenia is an informative disorder, so that knowing someone has schizophrenia tells
us a lot about the person.
Very strongly disagree
1
2
3
4
5
Very strongly agree
* Uniformity (entitativity)
Schizophrenia is a relatively uniform disorder, so that people with schizophrenia are very
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similar to one another.
Very strongly disagree

1

2

3

4

5

Very strongly agree

* Exclusivity (entitativity)
Schizophrenia is a category that is exclusive; such a category does not allow a person to
belong to other categories.
Very strongly disagree
1
2
3
4
5
Very strongly agree
Inherence (entitativity)
Schizophrenia is a disorder that has an underlying reality, so behind their symptoms,
schizophrenics are inherently the same.
Very strongly disagree
1
2
3
4
5
Very strongly agree
* Violence (control)
People with schizophrenia are often violent, and therefore present a danger to society.
Very strongly disagree
1
2
3
4
5
Very strongly agree
* Drugs (control)
People with schizophrenia use illegal drugs to escape their problems.
Very strongly disagree
1
2
3
4
5
Very strongly agree
* Societal burden (control)
People with schizophrenia are unable to make meaningful contributions to society.
Very strongly disagree
1
2
3
4
5
Very strongly agree
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APPENDIX E
Social Distance Scale
Please indicate your reaction to each of the following statements by circling the number
that most closely corresponds to your opinion about individuals with schizophrenia.
1
2
3
4
5
In no case
at all

In no case at all
Probably not, but I would think about it
I do not feel strongly one way or another about it
I probably would, but may have some reservations
In any case

In any
case

1 2 3 4 5

How would you feel about renting a room in your home to an
individual with schizophrenia?

1 2 3 4 5

How would you feel about having a schizophrenic as a co-worker?

1 2 3 4 5

How would you feel about having a schizophrenic as a neighbor?

1 2 3 4 5

How would you feel about having a schizophrenic as the caretaker of
your children for a couple hours?

1 2 3 4 5

How would you feel about having your son or daughter marrying a
schizophrenic?

1 2 3 4 5

How would you feel about introducing someone with schizophrenia to
a young woman you are friendly with?

1 2 3 4 5
How would you feel about recommending someone with
schizophrenia for a job working for a friend of yours?
1 2 3 4 5
How would you feel about working on a group project for a
class with someone who has schizophrenia?
1 2 3 4 5

How would you feel about sharing a dorm room or apartment with
someone who has schizophrenia?

1 2 3 4 5

How would you feel about being in a long-term relationship someone
with schizophrenia?

1 2 3 4 5

How would you feel about attending a party or social gathering if you
know someone with schizophrenia will be there?

1 2 3 4 5

How would you feel about sitting next to someone with schizophrenia
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in one of your classes?
1 2 3 4 5

How would you feel about going on a date with someone with
schizophrenia?
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APPENDIX F
Perceptions of Dangerousness/Dependency
Please indicate to what extent you feel the following attributes apply to individuals with
schizophrenia by circling the number that most closely corresponds with your opinion:
Schizophrenic individuals come across to me as:
Dangerous
Definitely not true

1

2

3

4

5

6

7 Definitely true

1

2

3

4

5

6

7 Definitely true

1

2

3

4

5

6

7 Definitely true

1

2

3

4

5

6

7 Definitely true

1

2

3

4

5

6

7 Definitely true

1

2

3

4

5

6

7 Definitely true

1

2

3

4

5

6

7 Definitely true

1

2

3

4

5

6

7 Definitely true

Aggressive
Definitely not true
Lacking self-control
Definitely not true
Unpredictable
Definitely not true
Frightening
Definitely not true

Dependent upon others
Definitely not true
Helpless
Definitely not true
Needy
Definitely not true
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APPENDIX G
Causal Attributions
There are many people in the community who suffer from schizophrenia. How likely do
you think each of the following is to be a reason for such problems? Circle the number that
most closely matches your opinion.
Very Unlikely
A virus or other type of infection
1

Neither/
Unlikely Don’t Know

Likely

Very Likely

2

3

4

5

2

3

4

5

Day-to-day problems such as stress,
family arguments, or financial difficulties
1
2

3

4

5

The recent death of a close
friend or relative
1

2

3

4

5

Some recent traumatic event such as
fires threatening your home, a severe
traffic accident, or being mugged
1
2

3

4

5

Problems from childhood such as being
badly treated or abused, or losing one or
both parents when young
1
2

3

4

5

Genetics or inherited (i.e. you’re
“born” susceptible to these problems)
1
2

3

4

5

Being a nervous person
1

2

3

4

5

Having weakness of character
1

2

3

4

5

An allergy or reaction
1
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APPENDIX H
Anti-stigma intervention

Natural Kinds Belief Intervention
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Entitative Beliefs Intervention

50

Control Intervention
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Reverse side for all intervention conditions Natural Kinds Belief Intervention
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APPENDIX I
Pamphlet Ratings
We'd like your feedback on the informational pamphlet you just read. Please respond to
the following items as honestly as possible, to the best of your abilities.
How well-written was the pamphlet?
Not well written

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very well written

4

5

6

7

Very well designed

How well-designed was the pamphlet?
Not well designed

1

2

3

How much did you learn about schizophrenia from reading the pamphlet?
Nothing at all

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

A lot

How likely would you be to recommend the pamphlet to someone who had a family
member with schizophrenia?
Not very likely

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very likely

Please write any additional comments you have about the pamphlet in the space provided.
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APPENDIX J
Social Dominance Orientation
Which of the following objects or statements do you have a positive or negative feeling
towards? Beside each statement, place a number from '1' to '7' which represent the degree
of your positive or negative feeling.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

VERY NEGATIVE
NEGATIVE
SLIGHTLY NEGATIVE
NEITHER POSITIVE NOR NEGATIVE
SLIGHTLY POSITIVE
POSITIVE
VERY POSITIVE

_____ Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups
_____ In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other groups.
_____ It's OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others.
_____ To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups.
_____ If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems.
_____ It's probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the
bottom.
_____ Inferior groups should stay in their place.
_____ Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place.
_____ It would be good if groups could be equal. (R)
_____ Group equality should be our ideal. (R)
_____ All groups should be given an equal chance in life. (R)
_____ We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups. (R)
_____ We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally. (R)
_____ We should strive to make incomes as equal as possible. (R)
_____ No one group should dominate in society. (R)
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APPENDIX K
Crowne-Marlowe Social Desirability
Listed below are a number of statements concerning personal attitudes and traits. Read
each item and decide whether the statement is true or false as it pertains to you personally.
1. Before voting I thoroughly investigate the qualifications of all the candidates.
2. I never hesitate to go out of my way to help someone in trouble.
3. It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not encouraged.
4. I have never intensely disliked anyone.
5. On occasion I have had doubts about my ability to succeed in life.
6. I sometimes feel resentful when I don't get my way.
7. I am always careful about my manner of dress.
8. My table manners at home are as good as when I eat out in a restaurant.
9. If I could get into a movie without paying and be sure I was not seen I would probably do
it.
10. On a few occasions, I have given up doing something because I thought too little of my
ability.
11. I like to gossip at times.
12. There have been times when I felt like rebelling against people in authority even though I
knew they were right.
13. No matter who I'm talking to, I'm always a good listener.
14. I can remember “playing sick” to get out of something.
15. There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone.
16. I'm always willing to admit it when I make a mistake.
17. I always try to practice what I preach.
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18. I don't find it particularly difficult to get along with loud mouthed, obnoxious people.
19. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget.
20. When I don't know something I don't at all mind admitting it.
21. I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable.
22. At times I have really insisted on having things my own way.
23. There have been occasions when I felt like smashing things.
24. I would never think of letting someone else be punished for my wrong-doings.
25. I never resent being asked to return a favor.
26. I have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different from my own.
27. I never make a long trip without checking the safety of my car.
28. There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune of others.
29. I have almost never felt the urge to tell someone off.
30. I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors of me.
31. I have never felt that I was punished without cause.
32. I sometimes think when people have a misfortune they only got what they deserved.
33. I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone's feelings.
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Appendix L
Debriefing:
Thank you for your participation in this research. The purpose of this study, in short, was to see
how effective various anti-stigma interventions were at lowering prejudicial attitudes towards
schizophrenia. The general trend of anti-stigma interventions in recent years has been to focus
on conceptualizing mental illness as a disease just like any other. However, there is evidence to
suggest that rather than lowering stigma and prejudice toward mental illness, these interventions
may have served to increase overall levels of stigma.
In the current study, we attempted to modify a different set of beliefs, known as “essentialist
beliefs,” through anti-stigma pamphlets. We hope to find that altering these sets of beliefs are
effective at lowering stigma, and to find support for the hypothesis that these interventions are a
better alternative to the current “illness just like any other” model.
In this study, we deceived you by leading you to believe that the pamphlets were intended for
distribution at the MSU Counseling Center. This was deemed necessary, as people often (and
sometimes unconsciously) disguise and minimize their negative opinions of others. This
phenomenon is known as “social desirability” in the field of psychology. It is important to note
here that all information in the pamphlets themselves, as well as in the educational schizophrenia
page that you received, is accurate and reliable.
In order for the results of this study to be valid, it is extremely important that future participants
not be aware of the nature of the study. Therefore, we ask that you please do not discuss this
study with any of your classmates who may participate in the future. If you have questions
right now, please ask.
We greatly appreciate your participation in this study. If you should have any questions about
the procedures or comments on the study, you may contact Dr. David A. Butz, Morehead State
University (d.butz@moreheadstate.edu) or Fredrick Chin (ftchin@moreheadstate.edu) for
answers to questions about this research or your rights. If you feel discomfort because of your
participation in the study, you are encouraged to contact Dr. David Butz, the MSU Counseling
and Health Services Center (606) 783-2123, or Pathways, Inc. (606) 784-4161.
To learn more about the problems with current anti-stigma campaigns, you may consult:
Lincoln, T.M., Arens, E., Berger, C., & Rief, W. (2008). Can antistigma campaigns be
improved? A test of the impact of biogenetic vs psychosocial causal explanations on implicit
and explicit attitudes to schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 34(5), 984-994.

